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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE B. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS.

CENTERVILLE ClTY, Golden L. Allen. Mayor:
and CENTERVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION,
E. Lee Hawkes. Chairman; and ROBERT B.
HANSEN, Attorney General, State of Utah.

Case No. 2-24508

Defendanb-Re~pondents.

BRIEF' OJ<' .APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This action was brought in the Second District Court in and for Davis County under
the Declaratory Judgments Act. Plaintiff asked for a declaration of his constitutional right
as a taxpayer which he claims is denied by proceedings of Centerville City in annexing plaintiff's property.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
From the District Court's ruling, the honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, plaintiff has appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Appellant desires a declaration of his constitulional, self evident, due process, and sovereign right to legal notice and election when his property is placed under the jurisdiction of
;1 corporate entity wielding the political power to tax and create debt.
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ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
The parties arc agreed that Centerville City has proceeded pursuant to Sec. J 0-2-·10
UCA 1953, as amended, lo annex appellant's property and that appellant\ property will be , 11
jectcd to tax assessments, liens, and cncurnbranccs by suid city which arc the b:i:,ic ;"'·
necessary for a deiermination of the issue in this appeal. ( Ans\vcr to Complaint. Scc-Jnd o
fense, Para. 1)
. ARGUMENT
The case will be argued in the order set forth in the points:
POINT I, establishes the basis of the argument.
SUB POINT A, the right to legal notice specifically.
SUB POINT B, the right to elective choice specifically.
POINT II, emphasizes the basic law.
POINT I
SEC. 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DENIES TO PROPERTY
OWNERS THE BASIC, FUNDAMENTAL, EQUAL, AND SOVEREIGN
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN DEROGATION OF ART. I,
SEC. 2, SEC, 7, SEC. 24, AND SEC. 27; AND ART. IV, SEC. I AND
SEC. 8, CONSTITUTION OF UT AH The basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice and elective choice is n1
provided in Sec. 10-2-401, UCA '53, the annexation statute. Said statute permits appellant
property to be placed under the jurisdiction of a corporate entity which wields the politicJ
police power to tax, bond, encumber, indebt, and control property without giving legal noti\
and election by the secret ballot which violates the due process clause of Art. I, Sec. 7, Cow
of Utah, which states:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
Sec. 10-2-401, UCA '53, provides:
"Whenever a majority of the owners of real property ... shall cause
an accurate p!Jt or map ... to be filed in the office of the recorder of
the municipality, together with a written petition; . . . and the governing body of the municipality, at a regular meeting . . . may by
resolution ... accept the petition for annexation, subject to the terms
and conditions as they deem rea:,onablc and the territory shall then and
.,
there be annexed and within the bciundarics of the municipality
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The right tu legal notice and elective chuicc is both a procedural and substantive due
process right.
16 Am . .fur.. #548, p. 940, states:

"·Procedural due proccs, may be defined as the aspect of due process
which relates Lo the rc4ui'>itc charnctcri<;tics of proceedings looking
toward a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; ... "
And at 1:357_ p. 683:
"'The words "life. libcrl.J. ~me! propcrly' as uoed in constitutions are
repre',entati1 ·~ 1erms. ;Jnd are intended to cover every right to which
a member of the body p8litic is entitled under the law. These terms
include ... the right to all liberties, personal, civil, and political ... "
I 6A Corpus Juris Sec .. #567, p. 539, states:
"In tlic course or d::vcloping its meaning the courts have gone beyond
its literal meaning of due procedure and have brought within it
substantive as well as procedural rights. When applied to substantive
rights. it is interpreted to me~m that the government is without right
to deprive a person of liJe, liberty or property ... "
And at #574. p. 603-604:
"The life and liberty of which a person may not be deprived without
due process of law are not limited to freedom from mere physical harms
or reslraint, but include all personal rights and the enjoyment thereof
. . . The terms 'life' and 'liberty' urc ,:seJ in the constitutional guarantees in a broad senoe as including all personal as distinguished from
property rights ... ?.nd generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."
By looking into the laws pertaining to municipal corporations at the time Utah became a
state. it is evident that the right to legal notice and elective choice, when one's property is
placed under the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation with the power to create debt for city
services, is a basic and fundamental principle of liberty.
Art. 1, Sec. 27. Const. of Utah, says:
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government"
Ir. State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 Pa~. 337, this court said at page 483 of 27 Utah:
'"In construing the supreme law, the meaning of the framers must be
a'iccrtai11cd from tlic whole purview of the instrument, and, in construing a particular section, the court may refer to any other section or
provision to a•,ccrtain wkt'. was the object, purpose, and intention of
the con.slitution makers in adopting such section. In a case like this
the court will also con,ider the system of government in vogue prior
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to and at the time of the framing l'I the L'\lihtitutinn, and the p()litical
history of the country, amL ou\ llf the d!lfcrc'lll con-;truction-, po">iblc.
will adopt and apply that which i-, mu'>l in accord with thL· grniuc, of
uur instilLttion-,, the most likely intended by the framer-, of the instrument Texa-, & Pac Ry. v. !nter-S~ate Com .. 1(>2 U.S. 197. 218:
16 Sup. Ct. 66<>: 40 L. Ed. 940."
When Utah became a state every municipal corporation with the political power to i" 1,
long term notes and create debt upon propcrty had as a requirement the ba,ic and fundament,
due process right to legal notice and ~lection including the extending of city boundaric'. Leg,
notice and election were required in ChapLer XL Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, An Act Pn
viding for the Incorporation of Cities. in the toll owing articles:
Art. I

Creation

Art. XV

Local Tax Asse,sments for Improvements

Art. XVI

Elections

Art. XVII

How Corporate Limits May Be Extended (Quoted
immediately below.)

Art. XVIII

Restriction of Corporate Limits

Art. XIX

How Cities May Disincorporate

Art. XVII, the annexation statute, provided:
"The boundaries of any municipal corporation may be altered and
new territory included therein after proceedings had as required in this
section. The council of such corporation sha!L upon receiving a petition signed by not less than two-fifths of the property owners . . .
give notice thereof by publication ... (including notice of an election)
... The votes cast in such territory so proposed to be annexed shall be
canvassed separately, and if it shall show upon such canvass that the
majority of all the votes cast in such territory, and majority of the votes
cast in such corporation, shall be for annexation. such council shall ...
make a certified abstract of such vote ... and ... file with the secretary of the territory ... "

If this law were in force today, the existing inh:ibitants of cities would have a voic
as to whether promoters of subdivisions could have annexed into the cities farming propert:
that must have expensive municipal services. Profits to promoters of such enterprises wouk
not be so attractive if the properties so annexed carried the full tax burden of the munic1
pal needs, but when all city taxpayers share the burden, debt and taxes in the city must inev1
tably increase. A recent item in a Salt Lake daily newspaper stated that cities in Californi.
have found tha: it would be cheaper to buy proposed subdivision land and retire it, than ti
provide the necessary and expensive municipal service' which require expanded water am
sewer systems. public parks, etc.
Probably because our first legislature had to write all the new statutes for the new stale
some statutes were borrowed from other state-;. Our annexation statute was copied frorr
Nebraska ( #1448, Laws of Nebr. 1895.) The situation faced by most all lcgisaturcs by·
Jog-jam of bills at adjournment time could ha\e contributed to the ncccs-,ity. Said statul
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uJ11t<1i11' rn: pru\ :·.w11 iw kg<tl i;otice nc1r elcct1on and is basicly our same statute of today
I 10-2--101 UC 1\ 'if/iltl.) HoV,L\CJ, t!l·~ !ir·l urninagc District Act (Laws p. 593, 1896) which
\1as cre<ited by llJ<.: fir l legislature, contained provisions for legal notice and election (Sec.
701 and 76-1-. Title 17, CLU 1898.)
SUB POINT A
PF<.OPEl-nY 0WNERS AJ<.t-, DENIED HIE RIGHT TO LEGAL NOTICE.
As seated hcrcinabU\e, at the ti111e our constitution was approved by the people, every
municipal corporation with power to issue long term notes and create debt had the requirement of legal notice to affected property owners including the extending of city boundaries
(supra.) This legal notice feature was incorporated into the new statutes in every instance
except the annexation law. The due process right to legal notice when extending city boundaries mw.t have been inadvertently overlooked :md has lain unchallenged in the courts. This
oversight of a fundamental due process of law is not so differentf rom the daily oversight
most of us make of things plainly evident before our eyes.
Our present day Utah Annotated Statutes ( 1953 as amended) provide for the basic
and fundamental due process of legal notice: (a) Incorporation of cities (10-2-102), (b)
Disconnection of territory ( 10-2-501), (c) Consolidation (10-2-606), (d) Disincorporation
(I 0-2-703), ( e) Bonding (11-14-2), in fact most all special district taxing, bonding, and
encumbrances upon property. However this due process right is ignored when property is
annexed into a city.
States surrounding Utah recognize the right to legal notice when property is annexed
into cities unless all affected property owners have signed the petition:
Nevada (Title 21, Chap. 268, Nev. Rev. Stat. 1977)
Sec. 268.654 Counties less than 200,000 population:
" ... shall cause to be published in a newspaper ... and ... shall send
a copy ... to each owner of real property."
Sec. 268.586 Counties 200,000 and over:
"The notice ... shall fix date, hour. and place ... describe the territory to be annexed. contain a fot of names and addresses of all record
owner;; ... and . . published in newspaper."
Idaho ( 50-222. Title 50, Chap. 2, Idaho Code 1978):
"WhL'i~c\c:r <1;1y land l1i11g contigcwus or adjacent ... by or with the
owner's authority or acquie,cence laid off into blocks containing not
more than five ( 5) ~1cres of land each . . . requests annexation in
wntrng . . it shall be competent for the council, by ordinance, to
declare the same . . a part of 'uch city."

Wyoming ( 15-1-501. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1977):

15-1-503 'The clerk shzi.11 give notice ... by publishing ... at least
twice in a newsriapcr ... and by mailing a copy ... to the property
o\lliU"" Tile notice shall contain a legal description of the area and
tlic nal!lc, of the person:, owning property within the area."
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Colorado ( 31-12-101, Colo. Rev. Stat. 1973):
31-12-108 "Said notice shall be published once a week for four successive weeks ... "
Nebraska has amended its annexation statute con:,idcrably to cover the different classes c
cities (Chapters 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Rev. Stat. Df Nebr. 1977).
For example, Sec. 15-106, is similar lo ld,1ho:
The proprietor of any land' within the corporate limits or contiguous
thereto may lay out such land into lots, blocks, public ways ... , file
plat and ... the city council may include ... within the boundaries
of the city."
Each of the different classes have a provi,ion as follows:
"This grant of power shall not be construed as conferring power upon
the council to extend the lines of a city over agriculture lands which
are rural in character."
In the instant case many farms of more than five ( 5) acres are included and practicall
the entire area is rural in character.

Art. I, Sec. 24, Const. of Utah, states:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
The basic right to due process of legal notice in the instant case cannot be classified afo
said to apply to a group of people whose property is placed under the jurisdiction of a mum
cipal corporation with the political power to tax, bond, encumber, indebt, and control sat<
property when the city is created; and then deny it to other property owners when the1
property is so placed under identical circumstances, conditions, and situations by annex,
tion. The basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice is one of the political righ1
which is inherent in the people and cannot be taken away.
Art. I, Sec. 2, Const. of Utah, states:
"All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit ... "
16 Am. Jur. 2d, #488, p. 849, says:
"The guilding principle most often stated by the courts is that the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requires that all
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions,
both in the privilege conferred and in the liabilities imposed.
Footnote: The decisions supporting this proposition are virtually
limitless in number. The following is a small sampling: ... "
(Cases cited in small print occupy the two columns three fourths
of the page.)
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Our

clllllC.\at1u11

:,t<etutc rcmaiDuJ practically unchanged until 1977 when the words

"al the lK\i rcguhr mcc'.ing·· were 2m :ndcd co 'at a regular meeting" because of an adverse
opinion in/,,, .en \'. [/uu,:1if1:/ City, 20 Utah 2d l 89, 281 Pac 2d 216 (1975). With this revic,ion d1·: 'Ltluk heh b·~corn~ c:ven mmc l1ncon:o'.itutional and unjust. Promoters of subdivisions
1

~,tt1 nm1 11~c:udc p;·opcrty in their ariI1cxation plats at the last moment, and cities can annex
in1mediai·Jy 11p1.1 1 prc .. ellla iun u~ the petition without notice of any kind whatsoever to interc.,tcd a11d arfcctcd partie'-> as in the instant case which leaves no opportunity to build a def
:nsc.
1

1

Respondent> aosertcd in the lower court that appellant did in fact appear at the hearing
1!1 lhc in:,tanl case (Sec transcript). Appellant had been advised approNimately one month

prior io ;.aiJ hcarinz that then; was insufficient support for annexation of his particular section
''ncl that it had been abandoned. He was surprised by an urgent call from a neighbor on
the 1 er; d"Jy of a hearing before the planning board on the annexation petition.
After s'eps were taken to counter the petition, the propor,ents changed the boundaries
of the plat. Appellant felt that he was in a situation like a mouse under the paw of a cat which

left him no recourse but to look into the laws and statutes where he discovered the glaring
oversight of a ba-,ic and fundamental due process right to legal notice. If legal notice describing the boundaries were published such a miscarriage of justice could not occur.
Appellant a~:ks this court for a declaration of his right to legal notice when his property
is placed under the jurisdiction of a corporate entity wielding the political power to tax and
create debt.
SUB POINT B
THE RIGHT TO AN ELECTIVE CHOICE BY BALLOT IS DENIED.
The basic right to election was also part of every act pertaining to municipal corporations al the time of statehood and was incorporated into all the new statutes of the new
:ocate except the extending of city boundaries. That the elective process is a basic tenant of
libcrly is cviden( in that this due process right is provided in our statutes today for incorporation of cities. consolidation, disincorporation, bonding, etc. (See ref. hereinabove.)
The Colorado statute (31-12-112 CRS 1973) provides:

''The municipality shail forthwith petition the district court of the
county ... to hold such election."
Sec. 31-12-107 of the Colorado statute provides for annexation by ordinance:
"PROVIDED. the ordinance annexing such area shall include a statement that the owners of one hundred percent of the area have petitioned
for such annexation."'
Thi,, kc:1c:. inviolate the due process right of election by the secret ballot even though
c>;'~!'lY owners sign the petition. Election in such and similar circumstances is
i:iilc'1 ut1 1 ig\:' 11hich cannot be taken away from the people.

'·"!'; of ti,
:111
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Art. IV, Sec. 1, Const. of Utah, states:
'The rights of citizcm of the state of Uiah to vole ... shall not be
denied or abridged .
And Sec. 8, states:
"All elections shall be by secret ballot .
This due process right to election by the secret ballot is a basic and fundamental principi
to a free people and has long been recognized as the only method whereby the expression r'
public sentiment can be honestly ascertained.
Cooley's Const. Lim. 6th, Ed., p. 760, says:
"The distinguishing feature of this mode (secret ballot) of voting is,
that every voter is thus enabled to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable secrecy ... and thus escape the influence which
may be brought to bear upon him with a view to overbear and intimidate, and thus prevent the real expression of public sentiment."
Appellant had intended to call witnesses and present evidence at the trial of this cas
to show that besides using men of popular and .-official civic and church stature, pecuniar
considerations were used to influence the petition drive by the proponents of said annexation
However, such evidence could only bring embarrassment to some and delay the adjudic'
tion of the basic, vital, and important constitional question involved and could not effo
the correcting of the continuing wrongs being perpetuated by a city extending its boundaries, lil
an insatiable octopus, to supposedly increase its "tax base" and enhance its importance by prr
viding ever growing and expanding economic needs for some people at the expense of other!
which leads to despotism unless held under control by constitutional limitations.
POINT II

THE CONSTITUTION IS THE LAW OF THIS ST A TE, NOT A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT.
The fundamental principles "essential to the security of individual rights and the per
petuity of free government" expressed in Art. I, Sec. 27, supra, permeate the entire two vo!
umes of the Proceedings of our Constitutional Convention. The "conservative" and "liberal
arguments of today were all expressed at that time. The minority wanted the new legislatun
to have a free hand to decide and provide for the wants and needs of the people. In other word
they wanted a democracy instead of rule by comtitutional law, a republic.
The fundamental principle of rule by constitutional law was well expressed on the f!0\1
of our Constitutional Convention by Mr. Varian, Proceedings, Vol. II, p. 996:
"There have been ... propositions, which some of us thought might
well have been left to the decision of the people . . . which in the
opinion of the majority on this floor, have not been permitted to prevail.
What is the object of a constitution '7 It is not alone to declare what
everybody knows to be self evident facts concerning life, liberty, (l/U/
property. It is also to include prohibitions against future mistakes and
wrongs that may be committed by the people." (Emphasis added)
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The 1rnnority \icw al the '.,aid conYcntion was expressed by respondents at the hearing
of thi'> case in the loWL'r court. Respondents quoted 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Part B, #57, p. 113, (See

transcript) .
"The power to a1~11ex co11tiguous territory to municipal e-0rporations is
a legislative power, e.xisting exclusivdy in the legislature as an incident
to the power to create and abolish iihinicipal corporation at will."
However. the fir:,t sentence of Part B, :/¢55, p. 111, says:
"In th!' ub11'.'l!'e of cowtitutionul limitations the legislature has full
power in its discretion ... " (Emphasis added)

As a matter of fact, Part A. ;1¢50, p. 108, Ex;"nsion of Boundaries, General, says:
"In the u/J.1!'nce of any constitutional restriction the legislature has full
power in its di:,cretion ... " (Emphasis added)

Mr. McQuillin even questions the right lo unlimited control in the absence of constitutional restrictions. I McQuillin Mun. Corp. 2d Ed .. #188, p. 545-6, says:
"It i' difficult to accept in its en~irety Lhe doctrine of absolute unlimited legislative control, if the view should be adopted which is undoubtedly historically correct, that lucal self-government of the municipal
corporation does not spring from, nor exist by virtue of, written constitutions, nor is it a mere privilege conferred by the central authority.
The fact is, as repeatedly pointed out, that the people of the various
organized communities exercised their rights of local self-government
under the protection of these fundamental principles which were
accepted, without doubt or question, when the several constitutions
were promulgated.
"Therefore, it appears clear that in a government in which the legislative power of a state is not omnipotent, and in which it is axiomatic
that local self-government is not a mere privilege, but a matter of absolute political right, the existenc:- of unlimited authority in the state
does not exist. Graham v. Fre.1no, 151 Cal. 465, 91Pac.147; Blanding
r. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Stute ex rel. v. Barker, 89 N.W. 204 (Ia.):
People ev rel v. Detroit, 29 Mich. 108; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich.
44; Helena Cons. Water Co. v. Steel, 49 Pac. 382 (Mont.); Wolff v.
New Orleans, I 03 U.S. 358."
Sec. 10-2-40 J, UC A, supra, denies to appellant a basic and fundamental due process
right to life, liberty, and property which is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."
I 6A Corpus Juris Sec., #567, p. 540, states:
"The term 'due process of law' is synonymous or interchangeable with
or equivalent to 'law of the l::mcl,' a phrase appearing in many state
constitutions. due process of law being said to mean in brief, the law
of the land. including the unwritten law."
And at #568, p. 545:
"Certainly 'due process of law: or 'the law of the land,' does not mean
merely an act of the legislature. for such a construction would abrogate
all re;,t11ctions on legislative power."
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Cooley's Const. Lim. 6th Ed., p. 436, say;:
"It is entirely correct, :.ilso, in assuming that a legislative enactment
is not necessarily the law of the land. The words 'by the law of the
hand' as used in the constitution. do not mean a statute pas:,cd for the
purpose of working the wroi1g. That corn.truction would render the
restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn thi:' part of the con:;titution
into mere nonsense. Tl1e people would be made (~) say to the two
houses; 'You shall be vested with the legislative power of the ;;tatc.
but no one shall be di:Jrapchised or deprived of any the rights or
privileges of a citizen, unless you 1nss a statute for that purpose.
In other words you shall not do the wrong unless you choose to do it.'
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140."'

Because the basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice and election
secret ballot is a "self evident fact concerning life. liberty, and property," appellant as
this court to declare his constitutional, self evident, due process, and sovereign right there
when his property is annexed into a city. These rights have been and arc now granted
and enjoyed by other property owners in like and similar circumstances, and as stated in
I, Sec. 2, supra, "all free governments are founded by the people for their equal protecti
and benefit."

CONCLUSION
Appellant is attorney for himself ( 1) because of financial considerations, and
he hesitates to place this vital and important issue into the hands of someone who might
affected by possible harrassment for taking an unpopular stand in defense of principles invol
ing local sdf-government and less centralized control by government; for less centralized cont
is contrary to the marshalled and pushed plans to municipally incorporate entire counti
to provide municipal services for subdivision property in unincorporated areas which
expand the "municipal tax base" and aid and abet our ever mounting debt, inflation, and tax
but which experience teaches enhances the fortunes of certain special interest groups a
private individuals.
Appellant has set his pen and voice in defense of the constitutional form of our repub'
which is a government ruled by the constitutional law rather than by regulations, resolutio
and fancies of men which is prelude to dictatorship and slavery. A godless philosophy
moving to engulf us and the existence of our Judeo-Christian, free enterprise western ci
zation is in grave jeopardy.
Appellant asks this court to stand in the dignity of their duty as watchmen on the tow
guarding our constitutional freedoms and, thus. keep alive the affirmation in the preamble
our state constitution: "Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty."
Respectfully submitted,
Clyde B. Freeman
Appellant
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